How to respond to Putin’s land grab and nuclear gambit

On September 30, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed agreements illegally incorporating Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts into Russia. He said Moscow will “defend our country with all the forces and resources we have.” He previously hinted that this could include nuclear weapons. Nuclear threats are not trivial, but Ukraine and the world should not be intimidated. The West should react with its own political and military signals.

Fake referendums

The annexation of the four oblasts came 31 weeks after Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine and four days after the Russian occupiers completed so-called “referendums” on joining Russia. These “referendums” were illegal under international law, lacked credible independent observers, and in some cases required people to vote literally at gunpoint. The views of millions of Ukrainian citizens who previously fled Russian occupation were not taken into account.

On this weak basis, Putin declared Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson to be parts of Russia, although the Russian military does not control all of these areas. In fact, the Russian army is on the defensive and retreating while Ukraine counterattacks. On October 3-4, Russia’s legislative bodies, the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council, unanimously approved the annexations.

Putin’s territorial grab has two obvious motives. First, he seeks to divert domestic attention from the cost of the war (including tens of thousands of Russian soldiers killed and wounded), recent battlefield setbacks, and a chaotic mass mobilization. He wants to sell the Russian public the idea that Russia has gained territory, so it must win.

Second, he hopes to dissuade Ukraine from continuing its counteroffensive and dissuade the West from supporting Kyiv. On September 30, Putin said Ukraine’s four oblasts would be “forever” Russian and defended “with all the means at our disposal.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said attacks on the four oblasts would be considered attacks on Russia itself.

Putin has hinted at a nuclear threat to intimidate Ukraine and the West. The Russian declaration policy provides for the possible use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack on Russia “when the existence of the state is in danger”. Putin is trying to set up a nuclear umbrella over the territories conquered by Russia.

Putin’s nuclear gambit

You can’t ignore Putin’s ploy: it’s a nuclear threat, after all. But one should also understand that he has seriously gone too far.

Russia could lose this war – that is, its military could be pushed back to the lines before Russia’s invasion on February 24, or even before Russia conquers Crimea – and Russia’s very existence would not be in jeopardy. Ukraine’s goal is to drive the Russians out of Ukraine. The Ukrainian army will not march on Moscow; In fact, the Ukrainians have been extremely prudent, only conducting a small number of attacks against targets on Russian territory (i.e. Russian territory as agreed by the post-Soviet states in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union).

Moscow experts are trying to portray the war as a conflict with the West, which they claim aims to destroy Russia. Maybe it feels better to lose to the West, not just to Ukraine. Still, Western leaders have made it clear that while they will support Kyiv with arms and other aid, they will not send troops to defend Ukraine. They do not seek the downfall or dismemberment of Russia; They want to get Russia out of Ukraine.

So losing the war would not be existential for Russia. That could turn out to be right for Putin, or at least for his political future. The nuclear fear arises because as Putin grows more and more desperate, he may see Russia’s fate and his own as one and the same.

However, Putin is probably aware that Russia’s use of nuclear weapons would open a Pandora’s box of unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences, including for Russia. Moreover, more sober Russian politicians and military officials understand these risks. Would you allow Putin to put Russia in such danger? The decision to go to war rested with Putin; Losing may be existential for him, but it doesn’t have to be for others in Moscow.

While minimizing nuclear risks is an understandable concern, the West must also weigh the price of agreeing to Putin’s move. If he can use vague nuclear threats to persuade the West to accept illegal annexations after bogus “referendums,” then what? Putin himself has suggested Narva, a town in NATO member Estonia, is a “historically Russian” country. If his ploy succeeds in Ukraine, could he be tempted to seize parts of the Baltic states, annex them and declare a nuclear threat to try to secure his ill-gotten gains?

Western embassies

Putin is trying to create a new geopolitical reality in Europe, a reality that few, if any, will accept. The West should respond with targeted messages of its own, some of which have begun.

First, Washington has set the right tone. On September 18, US President Joe Biden warned Putin against using nuclear weapons and said the US response was “consistent”. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated this point on September 25, noting “that any use of nuclear weapons will have disastrous consequences for Russia, that the US and our allies will respond decisively.” Both rightly left the specific nature of the US and allied response ambiguous. Strategic ambiguities have Russians worried about what might happen.

In a private message, Washington warned Moscow against using nuclear weapons. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley have regularly spoken to their Russian counterparts and are now scheduled to speak to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov would be closely involved in any consideration of using nuclear weapons. They may have a more serious understanding than Putin of what the use of nuclear weapons could mean for Russia, and what is existential for Putin may not be existential for them.

Second, Washington’s and Kiev’s other friends in the West should communicate their position to the Russian people, perhaps in a joint public statement. Such a statement should underline that the West’s goal is not the annihilation of Russia, but the withdrawal of the Russian army from Ukrainian territory, or at least a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv.

Third, Western diplomats should raise the Russian threat with their counterparts in Beijing, Delhi and other global South capitals. Moscow needs to understand that any resort to nuclear weapons in a failed war against Ukraine would make Russia an international outcast.

Fourth, the West should increase military aid to allow Ukrainians to advance and liberate more areas from Russian occupation. In particular, Washington should equip ATACMS – 200-mile range surface-to-surface missiles – with the proviso that they do not target Russia (within its 1991 borders), as is currently the case for shorter-range missiles supplied by the US . But the door should be left open to end this restriction should Russia escalate.

As the Kremlin continues to wage a war of aggression and tries to convince the world that its annexations are legitimate, Putin has chosen to play a risky game. Western embassies should ensure that Russia’s political and military elites understand that the game poses serious risks for both Russia and themselves.