Russian Tanks Have Crude Mine-Defenses. They Don’t Work Against The Latest American Mines.
KMT-5.
Photo of the Russian Army
The winter offensive of the Russian army failed almost everywhere except for Bakhmut. Ukrainian anti-tank mines – some buried, others scattered by special artillery shells – are a major reason for this.
But it is not enough for the Ukrainians to mine the roads and fields where they expect the Russians to advance. For mines to work, Russian mine countermeasures have to work not work.
Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the standard Russian tank mine clearance system is grossly inadequate for the crews of those tanks.
For the Ukrainians, the same system – the KMT-7 mine roller – is a great boon. It might give some Russian tankers just enough confidence to roll straight into a possible minefield without them Also to protect them from the mines.
There is plenty of evidence that Russian tanks with the KMT-7 rollers attached to their hulls met bad ends after triggering mines beneath their vulnerable floors. It is not difficult to guess what is happening.
Russian mining rollers – the KMT-7 and older KMT-5 – are essentially dual sets of heavy steel wheels with bucket-like plows directly behind each wheel set.
The rollers attach to the front of a tank. The idea is that a roller’s wheels apply enough pressure to set off mines Before the tank itself rolls over them. The plows would dig up any mines that the rollers missed.
The problem is that KMT’s mine rollers only work on pressure-triggered mines like the Soviet TM-62. But modern Western mines have multiple trigger options, including magnetic proximity.
A minefield of American-made magnetically triggered long-range anti-personnel mines – scattered by 155mm artillery shells – is fairly immune to a KMT mine roller. A Russian tank could roll up and dig up the RAAMs with its KMT-5 or KMT-7 quiet trigger the mines.
Worse for the Russians, the Ukrainians tend to mix mine types. Bury some TM-62s, then sprinkle RAAMs on top. These mixed minefields stopped Russian attacks near Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region, 60 miles south of Bakhmut.
A video apparently filmed in Donbass by a Russian T-72 tank crew late last year illustrates the Russian dilemma. In the video, the T-72 sets off a pressure mine with its KMT-7 and detonates the mine safely in front of the tank. But a few seconds later, a second mine – maybe a magnetic one – hits the tank.
It is possible that some Russian crews will lose confidence in their mine rollers or “trawls”. “In the summer in Popasna there were abandoned trawls on almost every street”, wrote a moderator of the popular pro-Russian Internet forum Lost Armor.
There aren’t many better anti-mine countermeasures to replace the KMTs. Explosive wire charges, such as those fired from the UR-77 engineer vehicle, can clear lanes through possible minefields.
But the UR-77’s rope-like charges, which hurl the vehicle hundreds of yards ahead, are inaccurate. “They get blown away by the wind up to 30 degrees,” the Lost Armor host explained.
The latest Russian demining vehicle, the BRM-3M, adds a magnetic device to its mine rollers. This system could Working against mixed minefields.
But there are not many BRM-3Ms in Russian service – and even fewer in Ukraine. So when Russian troops brave a minefield, they usually do so NO countermeasures or with countermeasures that only half work.